Wilderness Case Law

This page contains a compilation of court case summaries related to the Wilderness Act of 1964. These cases are organized into eight distinct categories: Commercial Services, Cultural Resources, Fish & Wildlife, Access, Minerals, Motor Vehicle, Resource Protection, and Water Rights. Each case summary provides details on court rulings regarding various violations under these categories.

To navigate among the categories use the left navigation provided. For questions about specific cases or wilderness case law, please contact the Arthur Carhart National Wilderness Training Center at 406-243-4682.

This page includes case law up to May 30, 2017.

Commercial Services

Minn. Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973)

Background

Nonprofit corporation brought action in which it sought temporary and permanent injunction against logging in a portion of national forest that was designated as a wilderness area until the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act and attendant regulations were complied with and in which it sought to have logging in virgin forest portion of the area permanently enjoined. The defendant paper producer counterclaimed for declaratory judgment that total prohibition of logging in area was an unnecessary restriction and for an order enjoining the interference with the producer’s existing timer sales in the area. Defendant filed a cross claim against the government seeking an order determining that total proscription of logging in the BWCA Portal Zone would constitute an illegal “unnecessary restriction.” Plaintiffs assert that the express requirement of § 4(d)(5) of the Wilderness Act of 1964 says that the Secretary of Agriculture should maintain the primitive character of the BWCA by imposing restrictions which are necessary. They assert specifically that the primitive character of the virgin forest areas of the BWCA can only be maintained by prohibiting logging in such areas. Plaintiffs also assert that the USFS was arbitrary and capricious in not providing an environmental impact statement before logging in the BWCA.

Holding

NEPA Violation:

The USFS acted arbitrarily and capriciously and in violation of NEPA by not preparing an EIS before logging in the BCWA. The fact that the BWCA is a Wilderness Area by the USFS, which has specific rules and regulations that recognize the importance of preparing an impact statement when dealing with wilderness areas, leads to the inescapable conclusion that an impact statement should have been prepared. The evidence showed that logging results in a high degree of ecosystem disturbance, has a irreversible impact on the BWCA, that many small actions have been taken in regard to logging in the BWCA by the USFS, that the BWCA is an important national resource, that the BWCA is a unique and a rare resource and that there has been public controversy over logging in the BWCA.

Injunctive Relief:

The court granted a preliminary injunction because:

The evidence clearly showed that logging destroys the primitive character of the wilderness area and the Wilderness Act mandates that the primitive character of the BWCA be maintained. Therefore, the there is a strong possibility that further logging in the BWCA will be entirely prohibited or be restricted to non-virgin forest areas under the Forest Service’s new BWCA Management Plan.
The plaintiff has shown that many of its members use and enjoy the BWCA for its primitive recreational value, that others have used it for scientific research on various wilderness phenomena. If logging is allowed to continue in such areas pending the Forest Service’s completion of its new BWCA Management Plan and the accompanying impact statement, they will be further reduced and the members of plaintiffs who intend to use the BWCA in the future will be irreparably harmed.
The court finds that there is little or no possibility of substantial injury to the defendants as a result of the injunction sought by plaintiff.
The public interest in setting aside and preserving the BWCA and other wilderness areas in their primitive states is of greater importance and thus outweighs the public interest n the economic value of the employment and income generated by the timber industry because of the evidence suggesting that none of the private defendants would go out of business or even have reduced business if logging were enjoined in the BWCA.

The court relied on Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair, 353 F.Supp. 698 (D.C.Minn., 1973) to hold that there is an inherent inconsistency in the Congressional Act and it falls in the lap of the court to determine which purpose Congress deemed most important and thus intended, and the Wilderness objectives override the contrary mineral right provision of the statute.

Key Language

The Secretary observed and ruled that commercial timber cutting in the BWCA will be continued in the remaining one-third of the Canoe Country, subject to strict application of the principle that there will be no cutting which will present a hazard to maintaining a desirable recreation environment adjacent to lakes and water courses. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(2) within the Wilderness Act of 1964 dealing with mineral activities provides that “nothing in this chapter shall prevent within national forest wilderness areas any activity, including prospecting, for the purpose of gathering information about mineral or other resources, if such activity is carried on in a manner compatible with the preservation of the wilderness environment. The court relied on Judge Neville’s conclusion to the contrary of this statute in Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair that “a Wilderness purpose plain and simply has to be inconsistent with and antagonistic to a purpose to allow any commercial activity such as mining within the BWCA … there can be no question but that full mineral development and mining will destroy and negate the wilderness or most of it ….” (Note: that case was overruled by Izaak Walton v. St. Clair, 497 8.2d 849 (1974)) The court concluded that this “pro-mining” statute is contrary to wilderness values because wilderness and mining are incompatible.

Minnesota Public Interest Research Grp. v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976)

Background

Action was brought for declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit logging in virgin forest areas of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area of Minnesota. Plaintiffs MPIRG and Sierra club filed the present action against the secretary of Agriculture to prohibit logging in virgin forest areas of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area of Minnesota (BWCA). The BWCA is located entirely in a wilderness area governed by the Wilderness Act. At issue here is the logging in the Portal Area of the BWCA, which also encompasses the shoreline timber. Plaintiffs claim that the Wilderness Act forbids commercial logging in wilderness areas.

Holding

The Wilderness Act does not prohibit commercial logging of virgin forest timber in the BWCA because the commercial cutting was historically permitted before the area became a designated wilderness area.

Key Language

The Wilderness Act contains a provision that provides that the prohibition against commercial enterprises, including commercial logging, within any wilderness area designated in the act, is subject to existing private rights. The administrative history of the BWCA and the legislative history of the Wilderness Act conclusively show that logging was to continue as a permissible use within the BWCA’s Portal Zone under the Act. In 1964, the Wilderness Act did not prohibit logging in the virgin forest areas of the Portal Zone. Therefore, because commercial logging is an “existing private right” that allows for an exception to the Act’s prohibition on commercial logging, its continuation is not a violation of the Wilderness Act.

Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 552 F.Supp. 951 (N.D. Cal. 1982)

Background

In two related suits, environmental organizations challenged decisions by the USFS to complete construction of the last six miles of a paved road and to adopt a forest management plan which would permit timber harvesting in the “Blue Creek Unit” of the Six Rivers National Forest. Plaintiffs allege that defendants, in violation of the Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C. § 1132(b)), failed to consider the wilderness value of the Blue Creek Unit as part of a larger potential wilderness area including roadless and undeveloped lands contiguous to Blue Creek. Plaintiffs content that “area” within the meaning of section 1132(b) means the total contiguous, undeveloped area of which Blue Creek is one part, rather than the Blue Creek Unit alone.

Holding

The court held that plaintiffs do not appear likely to prevail on this claim at trail. Completion of the final six-mile segment of the G-O road would not sever Blue Creek from other proposed wilderness areas since the existing paved sections of the G-O road already separate Blue Creek from these areas. Hence, defendants need not have considered Blue Creek as part of a larger undeveloped area when complying with the requirements of the Wilderness Act.

Key Language

Section 1132(b) provides that “the Secretary of Agriculture shall review for preservation as wilderness, each area in the national forests classified as ‘primitive’ and report his findings to the President. A smaller unit next to a larger potential wilderness area does not mean that it is within these larger areas.

McGrail & Rowley v. Babbitt, 986 F. Supp. 1386 (S.D. Fla. 1997)

Background

McGrail & Rowley owned a tour boat company. They applied for a permit to take tours in the Key West National Wildlife Refuge. The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) denied the permit. McGrail & Rowley appealed. McGrail & Rowley argued that FWS allowed another tour boat company to operate in the Refuge, so it was inconsistent that they not be allowed to operate also. FWS argued that the other tour boat company ran "passive and educational" tours that respected the wildlife, while McGrail & Rowley were more recreational and involved picnics and kayaking and Frisbees on the beach. FWS argued that McGrail & Rowley's tours were more likely to damage sensitive areas.

Holdings

On whether the agency’s actions were arbitrary and capricious: The court held that the agency’s decision that MRI’s uses were incompatible with the purposes of the refuge was not arbitrary and capricious. The refuge and wilderness within it were established to protect wildlife, birds, and their habitat. MRI’s business ventures, including playing frisbee in the shallow water on the beach and kayaking around the shore, were found to have potentially negative impacts on the sensitive ecosystem of the keys. In reviewing the agency’s decision, the court found that it acted appropriately.
On whether the FWS had the authority to regulate state lands and waters: The court held that the FWS had the authority to regulate commercial use of federal lands including submerged lands and adjacent state waters. The authority was vested in the FWS through the Property Clause of the Constitution. The Property Clause states “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States ….” 986 F. Supp. at 1394 quoting The Constitution, Article IV, § 3, cl. 2. In United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1979), the court expanded the federal government’s authority to include, “nonfederal land ‘when reasonably necessary to protect adjacent federal property or navigable waters.’” 986 F. Supp. at 1394. Therefore, the court held that the FWS was acting within its authority in regulating access to state-owned waters off Boca Grande Key.

Key Language

Commercial activities: activities that generate profit, including tours and guide services
Special use permit: The Refuge Act authorizes the secretary to “permit the use of any area within the System whenever he determines that such uses are compatible with the major purposes for which such areas were established.” Because the FWS regulation provides that “conducting a commercial enterprise on any national wildlife refuge is prohibited,” a special use permit may be authorized to allow the commercial activity. The Refuge act requires the agency to determine whether the permit is compatible (a use that will not materially interfere with or detract from the purposes for which the refuge was established) with the major purposes for which the area was established.

Wilderness Watch v. Robertson, No. CIV. 92-740 (TFH), 1998 WL 1750033 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 1998)

Background

Plaintiff Wilderness Watch brought suit against the Forest Service, alleging violations of THE WILDERNESS ACT in its management of the Frank Church Wilderness. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs, and the FS was required to comply with a remedial order. The order required the FS to remove any caches of goods from the wilderness area, assign camping spaces in compliance with FS regulations, and remove or disapprove permanent structures that are not “necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area.” Wilderness Watch v. Robertson, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14457, *3 (D.D.C. 1998). Wilderness Watch brought suit against FS again for failure to comply with the remedial order.

Holding

The D.C. District Court held that the defendants FS had adequately complied with the remedial order. First, the FS had attempted to remove all caches and had taken disciplinary action against outfitters who failed to clean up caches at their sites. Second, the FS has some discretion in locating campsites, and the location of some sites within 200 feet of trails, streams, or lakes was not a violation of the order. Third, the small permanent structures that the FS allowed did not violate either the order or the Wilderness Act. The permanent structures did not violate the order because they were small, unobtrusive structures (such as base logs, hitching posts, and stored lumber) that the FS deemed were necessary to meet the minimum requirements for area administration. Wilderness Watch argued that even if the permanent structures didn’t violate the order, they violated the Wilderness Act, which forbids permanent structures. However, the court found the FS’s reading of the Wilderness Act more persuasive – that the FS “may approve some permanent structures, but only as necessary for minimal management of the wilderness.” Wilderness Watch v. Robertson, at *19. Plaintiffs argued that the permanent structures were not necessary because they were not geared towards conservation values of the Wilderness Act. However, the court held that the FS’s approval of the permanent structures was reasonable because “management of wilderness areas is done with both the purpose of conservation and of ensuring that the public may use and enjoy the areas.”

Key lesson

The Wilderness Act does not expressly prohibit permanent structures when they are necessary to meet the “minimum requirements” for administering the area for the purposes of the Act.

Caches of goods kept by commercial outfitters on wilderness land are prohibited.

High Sierra Hikers v. Blackwell, 390 F. 3d 630 (9th Cir. 2004)

Background

The John Muir and Ansel Adams Wilderness Areas are located within the Inyo and Sierra National Forests. Each National Forest contains some portion of each wilderness area. The Forest Service regulates the usage of the wilderness areas by the issuance of permits. Commercial outfitters and guides, including those with livestock, who operate commercial services, must obtain a "special-use permit." The amount of wilderness use the commercial operators are allowed is dictated by "service day allocations." A "service day" equals "one person being assisted by an outfitter or guide and using the wilderness for one day." In 1997, the Forest Service issued a draft EIS proposing the replacement of existing Management Plans with new management plans for the Ansel Adams and John Muir Wilderness Areas. In February 1999, the Forest Service announced that it would issue a revised draft EIS, which it did in August 2000. On April 10, 2000, High Sierra brought suit in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Forest Service for management practices in the John Muir and Ansel Adams Wilderness Areas. Specifically, High Sierra alleged that the Forest Service's authorization of special-use permits to commercial packstock operators violated NEPA, the Wilderness Act, the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687, and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. On December 19, 2000, the Forest Service filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) High Sierra's challenges to the Forest Service's management program for the two wilderness areas amount to an impermissible programmatic challenge barred by Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990); and (2) there was no final agency action from which High Sierra could obtain relief under the APA. On December 20, 2000, High Sierra filed a motion for summary judgment. High Sierra sought declaratory relief that the Forest Service had: (1) violated the National Forest Management Act by failing to implement or meet Forest and Wilderness Standards; (2) violated the Wilderness Act by failing to determine that commercial services are necessary and proper, and by allowing services that degrade wilderness values; and (3) violated NEPA by failing to prepare environmental analyses before issuing special-use permits and other instruments that allow commercial services to be performed in the wilderness areas. On June 5, 2001, the district court found that the final EIS and the Record of Decision, accompanying the 2001 Wilderness Management Plan, had analyzed the need for stock services and concluded that such services were necessary. The district court also found that the Forest Service was vested with broad discretion under the Wilderness Act to determine how much commercial pack use to allow and how to deal with the impacts. However, the district court granted High Sierra's motion for summary judgment on the NEPA claim. The district court found that the Forest Service was violating NEPA by issuing multi-year special-use permits and granting one-year renewals of special-use permits to commercial packers without first analyzing the impact by completing an EIS, and issued an order, granting injunctive relief and ordering the Forest Service to complete a NEPA analysis of cumulative impacts by December 31, 2005, and a site-specific analysis for each permittee by December 31, 2006. In the interim, the district court ordered a reduction in the allocation of special-use permits and limited access to areas of environmental concern. Both sides appeal.

Holding

“We hold that the district court correctly found that the Forest Service was in violation of NEPA by failing to assess the individual and cumulative impacts of the issuance of special-use permits to commercial packstock operators in the John Muir and Ansel Adams Wilderness Areas.”
“The district court was incorrect, however, in granting a summary judgment holding that the requirements of the Wilderness Act had not been violated. We hold that the Wilderness Act imposes substantive requirements on an administering agency and that there are triable issues of fact regarding whether the Forest Service damaged the wilderness areas.”
“Until such time as the Forest Service complies with the court's order concerning the NEPA procedural requirements, and thereafter reaches a decision concerning the commercial activity permissible in the Wilderness Areas, the Court's interim injunction largely addresses the requirements of the Wilderness Act. The ultimate decision of the Forest Service will remain subject to the substantive requirements of the Wilderness Act.”
“We affirm the decision of the district court in granting the injunction, but reverse the summary judgment with respect to the Forest Service's compliance with the Wilderness Act and remand to the district court for a determination of appropriate relief under the Wilderness Act for remediation of any degradation that has already occurred.”

Key language

Commercial Services - “The issuance of multi-year special-use permits to the commercial packers constitutes ‘major federal action’ and requires the agency to prepare a detailed EIS.” “It is clear that the [Wilderness Act] requires, among other things, that the Forest Service make a finding of ‘necessity’ before authorizing commercial services in wilderness areas....Under the broad terms of the Act, a finding that packstock was needed to provide access to those people who would otherwise not be able to gain access for themselves or their gear, can support a finding of necessity. However, under the terms of the Wilderness Act, a finding of necessity is a necessary, but not sufficient, ground for permitting commercial activity in a wilderness area....The Forest Service may authorize commercial services only ‘to the extent necessary’ (emphasis added in original). Thus, the Forest Service must show that the number of permits granted was no more than was necessary to achieve the goals of the Act.”
Preserving wilderness character - “If complying with the Wilderness Act on one factor will impede progress toward goals on another factor, the administering agency must determine the most important value and make its decision to protect that value. That is what the Forest Service failed to do in this case. At best...it failed to balance the impact that that level of commercial activity was having on the wilderness character of the land. At worst, the Forest Service elevated recreational activity over the long-term preservation of the wilderness character of the land.”
Purpose of wilderness - “The Wilderness Act twice states its overarching purpose. In [U.S.C.] Section 1131(a) the Act states, ‘and [wilderness areas] shall be administered for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of these areas, the preservation of their wilderness character.” (emphasis added in original). Although the Act stresses the importance of wilderness areas as places for the public to enjoy, it simultaneously restricts their use in any way that would impair their future use as wilderness. (emphasis in original). This responsibility is reiterated in Section 1133(b), in which the administering agency is charged with preserving the wilderness character of the wilderness area.”

Budlong, Boggs, & Webb, 165 IBLA 193 (2005)

Background

This is an appeal from the decision of the Field Manager, Ridgecrest, California, Field Office, Bureau of Land Management, approving the issuance of a special recreation permit. In 1996, BLM issued an SRP which authorized SSE to conduct rock-climbing adventure trips in the Owens Peak Wilderness managed by the Ridgecrest Resource Area office of BLM in California. SSE’s permit would authorize it to conduct “Outward Bound” style outdoor adventure trips over the three-year period, including rock climbing, backpacking, canyoneering, initiative games, and general wilderness travel skills. Appellants assert that issuance of the permit is not in compliance with the Wilderness Act of 1964, and cite to the terms of the BLM regulations which prohibit commercial services within wilderness except where “appropriate for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the area.”

Holding

The decision is affirmed. The lands within the California desert wilderness areas established by the CDPA were preserved to provide for recreational use, and the commercial services existed at the time the area was designated as wilderness. Desert lands in Southern California offer “unique education and recreational values used and enjoyed by millions of Americans for hiking and camping, scientific study, and scenic appreciation.” Congress established a policy for such lands to “provide opportunities for compatible outdoor public recreation and promote public understanding and appreciation of the California desert. Section 102(28) of the CDPA established the Inyo Mountains Wilderness consistent with these findings. Additionally, the provision of section 4(d)(5) of the Wilderness Act permitting commercial services was crafted primarily for climbing, hiking, river and hunting guide services.

Key Language

Special recreation permits for instructor training in rock climbing, backpacking, canyoneering, initiative games, and general wilderness travel skills are not prohibited in wilderness areas established by the California Desert Protection Act, which authorizes commercial services in such areas.

Section 4(c) of the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2000), provides that, subject to existing private rights, “there shall be no commercial enterprise and no permanent road within any wilderness area designated by this Act;” however, it does not prohibit all commercial activity within wilderness. Section 2(c) defines wilderness to include land which provides opportunity for a “primitive and unconfined type of recreation.” Section 4(b), § 1133(b), ensures that wilderness is to be “devoted” to recreation and education purposes and section 4(d)(5) permits commercial services within the context of such recreation, stating that “commercial services may be performed within the wilderness areas designated by this Act to the extent necessary for activities which are proper for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the areas.”

High Sierra Hikers v. Weingardt, 521 F.Supp.2d 1065 (N.D.Cal. 2007)

Background

First, see HSHA v. Blackwell 2004. In May 2007, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the Forest Service, through the 2005 EIS and subsequent ROD, violated the Wilderness Act and NEPA, and seeking wide-ranging injunctive relief. The Forest Service opposed that motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The cross-motions were fully briefed and the Court held a hearing on the merits on September 5, 2007.

Holdings

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants’ Cross-Motion for summary

Judgment are granted in part and denied in part. (Note that the holdings were many and detailed. We have included a list of the items here with the understanding that they are more fully explained in the official opinion.)

The survey methodology underlying the Needs Assessment was unreliable.
Additional flaws in the Needs Assessment
The extent of the finding of need in the Needs Assessment was arbitrary and capricious.
The Destination Management strategy does not adequately address the preservation of wilderness character and improperly allows harmful spikes in use.
The Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to take a hard look at the harm to the
Yosemite Toad caused by commercial pack stock operations.
The Forest Service failed to take a hard look at water quality issues in the FEIS and allowed further degradation through increased grazing in already impacted areas in violation of the Wilderness Act.
Plaintiffs failed to show that they exhausted their administrative remedies with respect to grazing by domestic livestock.
The Forest Service’s change to the campfire policy was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Wilderness Act and NEPA.
The Forest Service’s decision to implement a 15 person and 25 stock group sizes does not violate NEPA’s requirement to consider reasonable alternatives.
Forest Service did not act arbitrarily in concluding that the issue of motorized access on the Muir Trail is outside the scope of the FEIS.

Key language

Preserving wilderness character - “Plaintiffs argue that the Act requires the Forest Service to preserve wilderness character, not simply maintain existing degraded conditions.
Defendants respond that ‘maintain’ and ‘preserve’ are synonyms and that there is no general restoration requirement. While Defendants may be correct that there is no automatic restoration duty in the abstract, the Wilderness Act does impose a general requirement on the Forest Service to manage wilderness areas so as to preserve the land’s wilderness character. More importantly, [because of] the Forest Service’s demonstrated failure in the past to fulfill this mandate,...the Ninth Circuit recognized a need for remediation under the Wilderness Act.”
Extent necessary - “[T]he Forest Service’s decision to count all persons with equipment too heavy or bulky to carry on foot as ‘in need of’ commercial pack services was arbitrary and capricious....The Forest Service’s argument that [the] items [listed] are not specifically forbidden in the wilderness area confuses the absence of a specific prohibition with the requirement of necessity; the fact that something is otherwise ‘legal’ does not make it necessary....This conclusion improperly equates ‘preference’ with ‘need.’”

Ventana Wilderness Alliance v. Bradford, 313 Fed. Appx. 944 ( 9th Cir. 2009)

Background

Organizations brought suit challenging Forest Service’s decision to permit to grazing on public land officially designated as wilderness. The grazing in this case had occurred for over 115 years while privately owned. Although there was a temporary cessation in grazing during a transition from private to public land, this temporary cessation did not serve to discontinue the use. The grazing was “established” for purposes of the Wilderness Act.

Holding

Because the grazing in this case was “established” prior to the effective date of the Act, allowing the grazing to occur in the wilderness area after designation was not a violation of the Wilderness Act.

Key Language

The Wilderness Act specifically permits grazing of livestock where it was “established” prior to the effective date of the Act.

High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 848 F.Supp.2d 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2012)

Background

This case challenges administrative actions and land management practices which allegedly impact the level of stock use in the Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks (“SEKI”). Plaintiff High Sierra Hikers Association (“HSHA”) asserts that defendants violated both the Wilderness Act and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) by issuing a General Management Plan (“GMP”) which permits the use of horses and mules in wilderness areas without conducting the proper environmental assessment of the impact of such stock use. The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment.

Holding

The GMP violated the Wilderness Act:
- “The courts have emphasized that the prohibition against commercial activity is ‘one of the strictest prohibitions of the Act.’” Thus, if an agency determines that a commercial use should trump the Act’s general policy of wilderness preservation, it has the burden of showing the court that, in balancing competing interests, it prepared the “requisite findings” of necessity. “[T]he agency’s primary responsibility is to protect the wilderness, not cede to commercial needs.” “[T]he fact that the NPS has committed to forego authorizing new types of commercial activities until after the [Wilderness Stewardship Plan is written] is inadequate. The NPS has issued a GMP which, programmatic or not, at the very least, provides for the continuation of stock use at its current levels. Pursuant to the Wilderness Act, a necessity finding is required. Because the NPS has yet to complete this finding, the GMP violates the Act.”
The GMP did not violate NEPA:
- NEPA is a procedural statute that “does not mandate particular results but provides the necessary process to ensure that federal agencies take a hard look at the environmental consequences of their actions.” Because NPS satisfied the NEPA requirement to consider reasonable alternatives, to a requisite “hard look” under NEPA, and continued to issue Packer Permits at the current level, it satisfied the procedural requirements of NEPA.

Relevance

Although the NPS did not violate NEPA in the process in which they issued the general management plan permitting the use of horses and mules in the wilderness areas of Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks and by issuing commercial use authorizations, the NPS failed to make the required finding of necessity that the Wilderness Act needs to allow certain commercial activities to override the primary goal of protecting the wilderness.

Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, No. C 29– 04621 RS, 2012 WL 1933744 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2012)

Background

Following an order granting in part and denying in part the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, High Sierra Hikers Association ("HSHA") filed a motion for partial vacatur and injunctive relief. This motion addresses the proper remedy for defendants' Wilderness Act violation and requests the imposition of interim measures while the National Park Service ("NPS") completes the requisite necessity finding and finalizes the stock-specific Wilderness Stewardship Plan ("WSP"). NPS responded with its own briefing on remedy, agreeing that both a partial vacatur and interim order were appropriate, but disputing plaintiff's proposed terms. For the following reasons, the motion for partial vacatur and interim relief is granted in part and denied in part as explained below.

Holding

Plaintiff's motion for partial vacatur and injunctive relief is granted under the following terms:

The Court hereby vacates all portions of the GMP and ROD which provide programmatic guidance regarding the type or level of commercial stock services necessary in the SEKI wilderness area or direction as to the need, appropriateness, or size of developments, structures, or facilities used completely or partially for commercial stock services. This includes all references to the future development or installation of stock facilities.
NPS shall complete the WSP and the specialized Wilderness Act finding no later than January 31, 2015. The WSP may consider both front-country and back-country matters as required under NEPA and other statutory guidelines. In conducting the analysis, the agency must consider imposing limits on group size, number of stock, trail suitability for various stock use types and the necessity of additional stock use facilities.
Pending completion of the WSP, the following interim measures shall apply:
1. A total number of commercial stock use permits may be authorized for SUNs equivalent to 80% of 3,200 SUNs. NPS shall use its best efforts to continue to monitor and reduce use of service days.
2. For the entirety of the interim period before NPS completes the WSP and the Wilderness Act findings, commercial stock operations cannot occur except under the terms and conditions of this order, and under any NPS directives which are consistent with this order.
3. Nothing in this order prevents NPS from permitting new commercial outfits, such as those utilizing burro or llama packers from competing with existing permit holders to provide commercial stock services.
If the Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks Back-country Access Act is signed into law, the parties are to submit separate briefs, each not to exceed ten pages in length, within twenty days of the statute's enactment directed to the effect, if any, of such law on the terms and conditions set forth in this order. 5. The motion by BHC to file an amicus curiae brief is granted. 6. All other interim relief requested by HSHA is denied.”

W. Watersheds v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. C 08–1460 PJH, 2012 WL 1094356 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012)

Background

This action concerns grazing right on the Big Ridge allotment located within the Marble Mountain Wilderness in the Klamath National Forest. The U.S. Forest Service manages the nation’s forests, and had issued a categorical exclusion for the Big Ridge allotment. As part of its management, the Forest Service issues grazing permits to cattle producers and ranchers, allowing them to graze their cattle on national forests under certain circumstances. On March 14, 2008, plaintiffs – comprised of various non-profit organizations concerned with environmental and wildlife protection – filed the instant suit against defendant Forest Service, challenging the Forest Service’s alleged practice of reauthorizing livestock grazing on federal land without conducting the proper environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act. Plaintiffs contend that the record is replete with reports of conflicts between cattle grazing and recreation use on the Big Ridge allotment, which established the presence of adverse effects to wilderness recreation by virtue of the proposed grazing action. The court concluded that the evidence in the record demonstrates the presence of a wilderness resource condition that constitutes an “extraordinary circumstance” with respect to the Big Ridge allotment, and so does not adequately support the Forest Service’s conclusion that there are “no conditions that would constitute a significant effect on an extraordinary circumstance related to the proposed project.” Without an explanation of how the contested grazing will not adversely affect the wilderness, the Forest Service’s conclusion that the permitted grazing will not have any significant effects on the wilderness is arbitrary and capricious.

Key Language

The Wilderness Act aims to provide opportunities for solitude and unconfined recreation, although it does allow for livestock grazing on wilderness land if the grazing was established on the land prior to enactment of the Act. § 1133(d) of the Wilderness Act states that “the grazing of livestock, where it was established prior to the effective date of the Act, shall be permitted to continue subject to such reasonable regulations are deemed necessary by the Secretary of Agriculture.” Wilderness Act protection constitutes an “extraordinary circumstance” resource for which the Forest Service is required to conduct an EIS. Thus, if there is substantial evidence of adverse effects to wilderness recreation use in the Big Ridge allotment, the Forest Service must perform a proper EIS or EA.

Drakes Bay Oyster Company v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073 (2014)

Background

Oyster farmers (Drakes Bay Oyster Company) sought review of the Secretary of Interior’s decision to let a special use permit for oyster farming on the Point Reyes National Seashore expire. The oyster farmers have appealed the District Court’s denial of their motion for preliminary injunction to stop the expiration of the permit, which would allow them to keep farming oysters. The Point Reyes National Seashore was established in 1962 by Congress in order to save and preserve, for purposes of public recreation, benefit, and inspiration, a portion of the diminishing seashore of the United States that remains undeveloped. Point Reyes is home to Drakes Estero, which is a series of estuarial bays. In 1976, Congress used its authority under the Wilderness Act of 1964 to establish the Point Reyes Wilderness Act, which designed certain areas within the Point Reyes Seashore as “wilderness” and “potential wilderness.” These wilderness areas in the Point Reyes Wilderness are to be administered for the “use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of these areas and the preservation of their wilderness character,” pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) of the Wilderness Act of 1964. The Act also provides that, subject to certain statutory exceptions and existing private rights, there “shall be no commercial enterprise . . . within any wilderness area.” 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c). Drakes Estero is a “potential wilderness” area that had not been designated as wilderness by Congress at that time. The decision reflected the Department of the Interior’s position that commercial oyster farming operations were taking place in Drakes Estero, as well as California’s reserved rights and special use permits relating to the pastoral zone, had rendered the area as inconsistent with wilderness characteristics at the time. Congress specified that this “potential wilderness” designation would become “designated wilderness” by publication in the Federal Register when the current uses in Drakes Bay inconsistent with the Wilderness Act have ceased to continue. Charles Johnson purchased the oyster farm in Drakes Estero in the 1950’s, and was in operation when Congress created the Point Reyes National Seashore in 1972. At that time, Charles Johnson sold his 5-acre oyster farm to the United States, and elected to retain a forty-year reservation of use and occupancy (RUO). The RUO provided that the Secretary may issue a renewed permit upon the expiration of the RUO, which ended on November 30, 2012. Drakes Bay purchased the assets of the Johnson Oyster Company in 2004 with full knowledge of the expiration of the permit and the understanding that it might not be renewed. It is the denial of this renewal that Drakes Bay has appealed from.

Holding

The Court affirmed the District Court’s ruling that denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, and Drakes Bay is now precluded from conducting any commercial oyster farming. Drakes Bay is not entitled to a preliminary injunction because it failed to raise a serious question about the Secretary’s decision and failed to show that the balance of equities was in its favor. The District Court reasonably found that the public interest does not weigh in favor of injunctive relief. Drakes Bay knew that the permit was set to expire in 2012, and purchased the assets knowing that the Secretary had the discretion to deny the renewal of the permit.

Key Language

Because Drakes Estero Bay was subject to become designated wilderness upon the expiration of the permit, and commercial oyster farming is inconsistent with wilderness management pursuant to the Wilderness Act of 1964 and to the Point Reyes Wilderness Act of 1972, the Secretary’s decision to not renew the permit was acting within her discretion.

Vermonters for a Clean Environment, Inc. v. Madrid, 73 F.Supp.3d 417 (D. Vt. 2014)

Background

Environmental organization and its members brought action pursuant to Administrative Procedure Act alleging United States Forest Service’s decision to issue a special use permit for a wind farm in national forest violated NEPA and the Wilderness Act. Plaintiffs oppose the Forest service decision to issue a special use permit to Deerfield Wind, LLC for the occupancy and use of an area of the Green Mountain National Forest in southern Vermont near the George D. Aiken Wilderness where Deerfield Wind plans to construct a wind farm. The seek an injunction prohibiting the Forest Service from issuing a special use permit to Deerfield Wind, LLC or a remand to the Forest Service for further environmental study. Specifically, Plaintiffs fault the Forest Service’s consideration of visual and sound impacts of the Deerfield Wind project on the nearby Aiken Wilderness. They argue that if the “mechanical sound” of turbines can be heard within the wilderness, “it will no longer be a wilderness.” They also take issue with the siting of the noise monitoring station on the boundary instead of within the Aiken Wilderness itself to obtain a better noise assessment in relation to other traffic and snowmobile noise.

Holding

The court determined that the Forest Service’s analysis of the visual and sound impacts of the Deerfield Wind project on the nearby Aiken Wilderness was sufficient under NEPA. The Forest Service also did not violate the Wilderness Act in granting the permit due to noise disturbance in the wilderness area. Given the proximity to the nearest highway and the presence of snowmobiles during the winter season, the Court found a noise level of 32 dB – almost half the decibel level of a conversation – is not degrading to the wilderness characteristics of the George D. Aiken Wilderness. The FEIS and ROD demonstrate the Forest Service thoroughly considered the effect of the Deerfield Wind project on the Aiken Wilderness, concluding the project would not cause undue adverse impacts and therefore would not impermissibly degrade its wilderness characteristics. Defendants thus did not violate NEPA or the Wilderness Act in issuing the special use permit to Deerfield Wind, LLC.

Key Language

In Izaak Walton League of Am. V. Kimbell, 516 F.Supp.2d 982 (D.Minn.2007), the court noted “a per se ban on all agency activity having some impact on the adjoining wilderness area would substantially impede [agency] administration of wilderness areas, and could serve to expand the wilderness boundaries beyond the area established by Congress. An agency must take into account the fact that, at some point, the wilderness stops and civilization begins.” Accordingly, the key question in deciding whether agency action violates the Wilderness act is whether that action degrades the wilderness character of a designated wilderness area. Factors to consider are: the nature of the agency activity, the existing character of the wilderness area, and the extent to which the essential, natural characteristics of the wilderness area are changed by the agency activity.

Wilderness Watch, Inc v. Halter, Case No.: 15-CV-3734 PJS/LIB, (D. Minn. May 8, 2017).

Summary

This is a settlement agreement regarding the commercial towboat use in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness. The parties have agreed that Defendants (Halter and USFS) will prepare a recreational commercial services needs assessment, as contemplated by 16 USC 1133(d)(5), to determine whether commercial services are necessary in the BWCAW, and if they are, they the extent to which they are necessary. Specifically, the assessment will determine if and to what extent commercial towboats are needed for activities that are proper for realizing the recreational and other wilderness purposes of the BWCAW. This determination will necessarily include ascertaining the current amount of actual towboat use in the BWCSW, and considering whether other opportunities for Wilderness access are sufficient in light of the potential impact of towboat use on Wilderness character. Defendants anticipate that they will complete the recreational commercial services needs assessment within 18-24 months, and agree that they will complete it no later than 30 months from the effective date of the agreement (May of 2017). If the defendants do not complete the recreational commercial needs assessment within 30 months, Plaintiff retains its ability to seek judicial enforcement of this agreement.